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Abstract
We employ the Schwartz and Smith (2000) model to explore the dynamics of the
UK gas markets. We discuss in detail the short-term and long-term market prices of
risk borne by the market players and how deviations from expected cyclical storage
affect the short-term market price of risk. Finally, we illustrate an application of the
model by pricing interruptible supply contracts that are currently traded in the UK.
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1 Introduction
Over the last twenty years the UK natural gas market has undergone dramatic changes.
Starting with the 1982 Oil and Gas Act, the British Government passed a succession of
laws designed to bring competition to the transmission and distribution of natural gas, ar-
eas previously monopolised by the publicly owned British Gas. With the 1995 Gas Act, the
groundwork was laid for the introduction of full retail competition in the natural gas indus-
try, creating licensing schemes for companies to engage in the transport and supply of gas.
This was followed in 1996 by the Network Code, a legal framework for the relationship
between the operator of the pipeline system (the now privatised British Gas Transco) and
shippers, those using the pipeline system to transport gas.
Network Code was designed to provide a set of market-based mechanisms to ensure
the optimal operation of the UK gas pipeline system by Transco. Successfully and safely
running a gas pipeline system is a complex task. The system operator has to carefully mon-
itor and control the system intake (gas injected into the pipeline system by producers) the
system off-take (gas withdrawn from the system by end-users) and the physical transporta-
tion of the gas around the whole national network. This is done to maintain an equilibrium
between instantaneous supply and demand for natural gas at the various Local Distribution
Zones throughout the country, and maintain system pressure and quality.
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A shipper running an imbalance, either injecting or withdrawing more gas than it is
contracted to, imposes a cost on other users of the system. To discourage the externality
caused by these imbalances, the Network Code allows Transco to impose severe balancing
penalties on shippers found to be breaching a certain tolerance level. The resulting price is,
often significantly, above the market price for gas when the shipper is short gas and below
the market price when the shipper is long.
This balancing mechanism requires the system operator to be provided with an up-to-
date market price of natural gas on which to base the balancing price. Before deregulation,
gas had overwhelmingly been sold to end-users on long-term contracts with terms agreed
upon in October of a given year. However, under the new system, smaller independent
end-user suppliers entered the market often purchasing 100% take-or-pay contracts from
producers.1 This created a demand for short-term contracts to allow new entrants to meet
their balancing needs, selling their surpluses back to the market. As a result, a highly liquid
spot market for gas developed. On January 31st, 1997 standardised gas futures contracts
were launched on London’s International Petroleum Exchange for delivery via a virtual
system hub, the National Balancing Point (NBP). This allowed for a system-wide trading
point and a national spot market needed for the purpose of balancing.
The development of the UK gas markets exposes participants to different types of risks.
One way in which market participants may manage their exposure to price and volume
fluctuations is by buying or selling instruments written on gas. One of the most common
and important types of these contracts has been the interruptible supply contract, which
gives the gas supplier the right to cease supplying his customers with gas for a finite number
of days throughout the life of the contract.
The contribution of this article is twofold. First, we employ Schwartz and Smith’s
model (Schwartz and Smith 2000) to explore the dynamics of the UK natural gas industry
to determine what economic factors influence spot and forward prices. Given the idiosyn-
crasies of the storage facilities in the UK gas markets, for example the constraints on inflow
and outflow, we argue that the relationship between the short-term market price of risk and
1Take-or-pay means the buyer of gas commits to buying a set annual contract quantity for which he or she
is obliged to pay, but if all the gas is not required there is no obligation to take it. This is sometimes referred
to as a ‘buyer’s option’ agreement as the buyer has the option to take the gas or not.
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storage is, to a large extent, determined by deviations from expected seasonal storage lev-
els rather than absolute levels. Second, we price interruptible supply contracts using actual
contracts traded in the UK as a basis (E.ON Energy 2005).
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the UK gas market
and motivates the choice of model. Section 3 proposes a spot model driven by short-term
and long-term shocks, plus a seasonal component, under both the physical and risk-neutral
measure. Section 4 discusses the estimation of the parameters for the model. Section 5
prices standard UK interruptible supply gas contracts. Finally, section 6 concludes and
discusses further work.
2 Spot Prices, Forward Curves, Risk Premia and Conve-
nience Yield
In this section we discuss the UK spot and forward data and the connection between the
two. Although earlier data is available we will use spot data from March 2003 to Jan 2006.
This is because in 1998, the Interconnector, a large pipeline connecting the UK gas entry
beach Bacton to the Belgian port of Zeebrugge, came online, creating a link between the
UK and Continental gas markets. Once these markets had adjusted to the new setup, UK
prices became heavily determined by the factors that determined the European gas price
such as the oil market. This structural change means that the pre-2000 data will no longer
be relevant to the current market.
In Figure 1 we can see the UK NBP Day-Ahead price from March 2003 onwards.
The path can be seen to include a long-term upward drift, a seasonal component (high in
the winters and low in the summers) and random shocks throughout. The peaks in spot
prices coincide with the coldest periods of each year’s winter, usually occurring in January
but occurring during March for 2005. They point to the fact that the seasonality in spot
gas prices is driven heavily by weather conditions, especially in the winter. In the winter
months, the colder weather increases the demand for gas heating from households and
businesses, as well as producing adverse conditions for production and supply from the gas
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Figure 1: Weekday Day-Ahead NBP gas prices: March 2003-Jan 2006
fields in the North Sea. These combine to cause tight supply and demand conditions, which
is reflected in higher winter spot prices.
Furthermore, to value derivatives, such as interruptible contracts, we have to be able
to model the spot price process under the risk-neutral measure. This naturally requires
understanding the market’s attitude to risk, as well as the value it places on it. In the
absence of a complete market this will have to be estimated by observing the quoted price
of derivatives where risk will already have been accounted for. The simplest and most
liquidly traded natural gas contingent claims are forward contracts.
Forwards curves in contango, ie positively sloped in T , are associated with times when
supplies are plentiful. We can see in Figure 2 that in June the forward curves are in contango
going into the winter quarters. In the winter quarters the curve then shifts into backwarda-
tion, ie negatively sloped in T , going into the summer. The market can be seen to place a
premium on ownership of gas in the winter relative to ownership in the coming summer,
ownership coming from production or from gas held in storage. The marked seasonality
in the forward curve prompts the question from where does this premium come? Looking
beyond the seasonal fluctuations we can also see that the overall slope of the curve is back-
wardated, a fact that might point to the effect of long-term risk exposure on prices. We will
address the matter of long-term risk first.
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Figure 2: Quarter forward curves late-2004
The theory of normal backwardation, originally postulated by Keynes (1930), moved
away from traditional backwardation and contango by shifting the emphasis away from
whether forward prices are above or below the current spot price, St , and on to how forward
prices relate to expected future spot prices, under the physical measure P. He investigated
this relationship by linking spot forecasts to forward prices through a forward risk premium,
pit = E
P
t
[
ST
]
−F(t,T), where EPt is the expectation operator with respect to the physical
measure with information up until time t and F(t,T) is the price of the forward at time t
with delivery T . When this risk premium is positive then forward prices are below expected
spot prices and the forward curve is said to be normally backwardated. If the premium is
instead negative, placing forward prices above expected spot prices, then the curve is said
to be in normal contango.2
Observing the steady backwardated trend in the forward curve we can theorise as to
what state the UK gas market is in over the medium and long-term, ie a year or longer into
the future. For example, if it is assumed that market conditions are generally the same from
year to year, and that expected spot prices will stay at broadly the same levels across time,
then it would seem that since the forward curve is actually backwardated, the risk premium
2In the literature the forward risk premium is also defined as F(t,T )−EPt
[
ST
]
.
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must be positive and must increase in magnitude with the length or expiry of the forward
contract, a situation consistent with normal backwardation.
Normal backwardation such as the one that seems to occur in the UK gas market can be
explained through long-run market structure and hedging demands. As a result of the large
sunk costs inherent to energy production due to exploration, production and processing,
gas producers have effectively “purchased” their supplies for a long period in advance. For
example Gazprom’s recently developed Yuzhno-Russkoye field in Siberia by itself holds
enough gas to supply the entire UK market for fourteen years, see Cahill and Gismatullin
(2005). It is natural, therefore, that producers would wish to sell very long-dated forwards
to reduce their exposure to adverse changes in the equilibrium gas price over this time.
Wholesale gas consumers, on the other hand, do not have such extreme sunk costs to cover
and therefore only require shorter-term hedges, purchasing annual or biannual contracts.
Therefore, although the hedging demand for customers with short-term positions decreases
as the maturity of the forward increases, the hedging demand of producers with long-dated
gas exposures does not. This means that these hedges have to be provided by speculators
who demand a risk premium as compensation for supplying what is essentially insurance
for producers.
Although the risk of long-run changes in price can be examined and evaluated through
a Keynesian forward risk premium, short-term price risk must be approached differently.
This is due to the fact that natural gas storage, practically unavailable over the long-run,
can be exploited in the short-term. Traditionally the effect of storage has been explained
through the concept of convenience yield of storage, which allows the application of more
traditional arbitrage arguments to forward commodity pricing.
We have to question whether storability and a deterministic convenience yield are suit-
able assumptions for the UK gas market. One difficulty comes from the fact that the rates
at which gas can be injected into and withdrawn from storage systems are limited. Often
during the main winter cold snap of the year, withdrawals from UK gas storage sites have
been at maximum outflow, whilst the spot price has continued to increase dramatically due
to the price inelasticity of short-term gas supply and demand. Parties with gas in storage
were prevented from taking full advantage of this price increase due to limitations in the
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withdrawal capability of the system. The arbitrage opportunities of storage therefore are
not as clear or effective as standard theory would suggest.
Further evidence against the assumptions of convenience yield and storage comes from
the fact that given a constant convenience yield, forward price volatility must be equal to
spot price volatility. This contradicts a well-known and observed property of commodities
futures prices called the Samuelson effect which states that forward price volatility will
decrease as the time to maturity of the futures contract increases. More recent papers such
as Schwartz (1997) have built the Samuelson effect into spot models by modelling the
convenience yield as a stochastic process in itself.
Dincerler, Khokher, and Simin (2004) state that although a great deal of what drives the
convenience yield is still undetermined, it is generally agreed that inventory levels have a
strong impact with the marginal convenience yield declining as a function of storage. What
is not necessarily agreed upon though, is how levels of inventory affect the price of conve-
nience yield risk. Brennan (1958) suggests that speculators will become wary of holding
stocks as the overall level of inventories increase, perhaps wary of being crowded out of
arbitrage opportunities as described earlier. To account for this, Brennan suggests spec-
ulators will price an increasing risk-adjustment factor into the cost of carrying inventory.
Others such as Ribeiro and Hodges (2004) have suggested that during times of comfortable
supply, when injections into storage increase, speculators will require lower premia in their
expected returns, so risk will be priced more cheaply as inventory increases. We, on the
other hand, argue that it is deviations from expected seasonal storage that producers take
into account. Producers must pay particular attention to the profile of inflow/outflow of gas
from storage. Storage facilities tend to be at their peak approaching the winter season (first
couple of weeks of December) and are normally depleted towards the end of April. Hence,
producers bear the risk of finding themselves out of line from where seasonal storage levels
need to be in order to maximise expected profits from storing gas.
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3 The Long-Term / Short-Term Model
Working commodity spot price models, using more than one factor, truly began with Gib-
son and Schwartz (1990) who introduced a mean-reverting stochastic convenience yield as
a second cause of uncertainty in the determination of prices. The spot price itself was mod-
elled as a geometric Brownian motion (GBM). The model was then solved numerically and
was shown to be capable of displaying the desired Samuelson effect, with futures contract
volatility decreasing as maturity increased.
Schwartz (1997) continued his work with this model proposing
dXt =
(
µ−δt −
1
2
σ21
)
dt +σ1dW1, (1)
dδt = κ(α−δt)dt +σ2dW2, (2)
with W1 and W2 correlated Wiener processes. Here Xt modelled the spot price with drift µ
and volatility σ1, whilst δt modelled the stochastic convenience yield, an Orstein-Uhlenbeck
process with mean reversion rate, κ, mean reversion level α and volatility σ2.
A shift away from direct convenience yield modelling occurred when Schwartz and
Smith (2000) devised a two-factor model in which log-spot prices were described as the
sum of two state variables, a mean-reverting short-term variation component χt , and a
long-term equilibrium price component ξt , modelled as a GBM. They proved that this
model was mathematically equivalent to the two-factor convenience model, (1) and (2),
with the short-term deviations being related to the convenience yield. This two-factor,
long-term/short-term (LT/ST) model, proved to have distinct advantages over the earlier
model as it replaced the fairly opaque concept of convenience yield with the simpler idea
of short-term deviations from the long-run trend price. The two-factors were related by
the correlation between their driving processes, and therefore the model became more ‘or-
thogonal’ than the model in (1) where the level of convenience yield δt directly affects the
evolution of Xt .
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We employ the LT/ST model with an added deterministic seasonality function g(t),
decomposing spot prices into three components, lnSt = g(t)+χt +ξt . The stochastic com-
ponents evolve according to the following SDEs:
dχt = −κχtdt +σχdWχ, (3)
dξt = µξdt +σξdWξ, (4)
with the two driving processes dWχ and dWξ correlated with dWχdWξ = ρχξdt. This model
has also been applied by Lucia and Schwartz (2002) to the Scandinavian electricity market.
A report by economic consultancy Global Insight into the UK forward gas market iden-
tifies the key real-world factors driving UK gas spot prices (Global Insight 2005). This
gives us an indication of what the three components of our model may represent. The re-
port claims that long-run equilibrium ξt , is driven not by long-run gas demand or long-run
marginal cost of gas but by crude oil prices. This feature is imported from the Continental
market through the Interconnector pipeline because European gas prices are index-linked
to European oil prices. The seasonality seems broadly to be a reflection of British weather
patterns, prices rising as temperatures fall with the onset of winter. Finally, short-term
variations χt are caused by unusual weather patterns: a prolonged frost for example; unex-
pected production and transportation problems, such as a gas field experiencing technical
difficulties; or rumours of either of these reaching traders and speculators.
To price derivatives, interruptible contracts for example, we need to be able to choose
a risk-neutral martingale measure Q, equivalent to the physical measure under which we
have already defined the LT/ST model, to model the risk-neutral dynamics of spot prices.
In line with most of the commodities literature (see for example Schwartz (1997), Cartea
and Figueroa (2005), Benth and Saltyte-Benth (2006)), we introduce two parameters to
represent the market prices of risk for short-term deviations and long-term equilibrium
price changes, λχ and λξ respectively. Hence,
dχt = (−κχt −λχ)dt +σχdW ∗χ , (5)
dξt = (µξ−λξ)dt +σξdW ∗ξ , (6)
where dW ∗χ and dW ∗ξ are the increments of Brownian motion under the Q-measure with
dW ∗χ dW ∗ξ = ρχξdt.
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As we have observed, producers with production schedules spanning far into the future
bear the long-term forward price risk λξ, of potential price changes damaging the value of
these sunk commitments. The situation is reversed in the short-run with producers inject-
ing or withdrawing gas from storage and consumers coming to market with price inelastic
supply and demand. This shifts the risk exposure onto consumers whose inflexible con-
sumption and balancing needs could leave them to bear the brunt of short-run price rises in
the event of an unexpected reduction in supply. This second source of risk is modelled as
λχ, the short-term market price of risk.
Above we raised the debate as to how inventories affect the convenience yield risk.
The parameter λχ in the LT/ST model is directly proportional to the convenience yield risk
in the two-factor Schwartz and Gibson model shown in equations (1) and (2). When the
short-run deviations from the equilibrium price rises, inventories will often be depleted to
take advantage of the higher price and vice-versa. We can therefore examine how changes
in inventory affect convenience yield or short-term risk through this relationship by making
the short-term risk become a linear function of χt :
λχ = α+βχt. (7)
The sign of β provides an insight into how the market reacts to changes in short-term prices.
For example, if β is negative, χt and λχ go in opposite directions. We note that with the
specification (7), the drift component of the risk-neutral χt process becomes
−(κ+β)χt −α,
hence we may write the risk-neutral process (5) as
dχt = (−κ∗χt −α)dt +σχdW ∗χ ,
where κ∗ = κ + β. It is straightforward to see the effects β will have on the risk-neutral
mean reversion rate. For example, a positive β implies a higher mean reversion rate. In
this risk-neutral world a positive χt causes a higher risk premium to be demanded, increas-
ing the magnitude of the negative drift and causing mean reversion to occur more quickly.
A negative β means that the risk-neutral world has slower mean reversion than under the
physical measure, with the risk-averse customers exposed to short-term increases in prices
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acting as if those increases will last longer than expected under the physical measure. Intu-
itively, we would expect that β < 0 since risk-averse agents will tend, as in standard pricing
theory, to give more weight to ‘unwanted’ outcomes, like a price spike, and less weight to
‘favourable’ scenarios.
Another interesting property of the market prices of risk, beside the effect of inventories,
is their comparative size. The worst-case scenario for a producer concerned about long-
term equilibrium changes will be the price falling to zero but consumers exposed to short-
run risk face potentially infinite price rises. As we can see in Figure 1 huge spot price
rises over short periods of time are not unheard of in the gas market, as shown by the three
price spikes visible in the data. These occurred in the winters of 2004, 2005 and early 2006
during times of simultaneous high demand, due to cold weather, and supply problems. We
would therefore expect the average magnitude of λχ to be larger than λξ. This effect could
be exacerbated by there being a partial hedge against long-term price changes, namely the
oil market due to the oil-index linked nature of European gas.
3.1 Forward Contract Valuation
We now have the full specification of our risk-neutral spot-price process, lnSt = g(t)+χt +
ξt , where
dχt = (−κ∗χt −α)dt +σχdW ∗χ , (8)
dξt = µ∗ξdt +σξdW ∗ξ , (9)
and κ∗ = κ+β, µ∗ξ = µξ−λξ.
This formulation allows us to value forward contracts F(t,T) on the gas price by taking
the expectation of the future spot-price under the risk-neutral measure. The forward price
for delivery at maturity T , set at time t is
F(t,T) = exp
(
g(T )+ e−κ
∗(T−t)χt +ξt +A(T − t)
)
, (10)
A(T − t) = µ∗ξ(T − t)−
(
1− e−κ(T−t)
) α
κ∗
+
1
2
((
1− e−2κ
∗(T−t)
) σ2χ
2κ∗
+σ2ξ(T − t)+2
(
1− e−κ
∗(T−t)
) ρχξσχσξ
κ∗
)
.
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4 Estimation of parameters
In this section we discuss the calibration of the parameters, κ,α,β,µξ,λξ,σχ,σξ and the
correlation between the driving Wiener processes, ρ, to recorded UK market data. We
must also approximate the other part of the spot price evolution, the annual seasonality,
g(t).
4.1 Contract Selection
We use data from the IPE Natural Gas Futures data published in various Heren Reports
(Heren 2001-2006), a daily gas market newsletter. For our futures price data, we have
taken two and a half years (Aug 2003 - Jan 2006) of daily Heren Index prices for the Month
+1, Month +2, . . ., Month +6 contracts, rolling the contracts over as one month ends and
another begins. As there is no true spot market for gas we will use the Day-Ahead contract,
the shortest maturity traded contract, as a proxy for the spot over the same period.3
4.2 Seasonality and Risk-Neutral Parameters
When using a relatively small data set, as we are, it is advisable to estimate as few parame-
ters as possible using the Kalman filter, see Harvey (1989). One way in which it is possible
to reduce the number of parameters we have to estimate is to remove the seasonality from
the data before we apply the filter as in Cartea and Figueroa (2005). At this point we can
proceed as usual and remove the seasonality present in spot prices from the data or we can
obtain this seasonal component from forward data; we have chosen to use the latter. From
equation (10) we see that for long-dated forwards the expression of the log-forward, as a
consequence of mean reversion, is given by
lnF(t,T)∼ g(T)+ξt +µ∗ξ(T − t)+
1
2
σ2ξ(T − t)−
α
κ∗
+
σ2χ
4κ∗
+
ρχξσχσξ
κ∗
. (11)
3In other commodities markets, such as electricity, the day-ahead price is also used as the spot price
Escribano, Pen˜a, and Villaplana (2005), Villaplana (2006), Benth, Ekeland, Hauge, and Nielsen (2003),
Benth and Koekebakker (2005).
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Therefore, to isolate the seasonal component g(T ) we first detrend the log-prices of a
long-dated forward (Month+4) and then fit a second-order Fourier series as in Cartea and
Figueroa (2005).4 We note that using the seasonal component g(T) estimated from spot
prices is also desirable, but only as long as current and expected market conditions do
not differ from those in the past. On the other hand, forward contracts reflect market ex-
pectations of what this seasonal component will be and care must be taken not to include
the risk-premium in the estimation of seasonality; a situation we have avoided by using
detrended log-forwards with long maturity.
Despite removing the seasonality there are still a number of parameters to estimate via
the Kalman filter: κ,α,β,µξ,λξ,σχ,σξ and ρ. Running the Kalman filter over the futures
data will not be sufficient to give us estimates of every parameter as the filter is unable to
distinguish between the relative sizes of λξ and µξ or between κ and β. The filter can only
pick up on their combined effects, µ∗ξ and κ∗ respectively.
To try and differentiate between the two we will first run the Kalman filter over the
futures series to obtain the Q-measure/risk-neutral parameters. Following that, we will
run the filter again over just the spot data to obtain the P-measure/real-world parameters.
When running over just the spot data we will allow κ and µξ to change and hold constant
4We could have used the M+5 or M+6 forwards but these are not as liquidly traded as M+4 forwards.
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the remaining parameters, σχ,σξ and ρ, as they are not affected by the change of measure.
The differences between κ∗ and κ, µ∗ξ and µξ will give general estimates of β and λξ.
The Kalman filter was applied to the forward data and the resulting maximum-likelihood
(ML) risk-neutral parameters are recorded in Table 1.
κ∗ α σχ µ∗ξ σξ ρ
UK NBP 10.18 1.29 1.38 0.15 0.24 -0.33
t-statistic 5.3839 2.6544 16.975 6.3131 4.6830 -1.6507
Table 1: Maximum-Likelihood Risk-Neutral Parameters and t-statistics
It is interesting to note that the correlation between the short and long-term shocks is
negative, ie ρ < 0. This result may be expected since it implies that long-term movements
do not necessarily affect, on average, short-term prices. In other words, a long-term shock
that would move the spot price up is compensated by movements in the opposite direction
via negative short-term shocks. Furthermore, in the UK gas market it is generally observed
that short-term ‘blips’ in the spot market are immediately followed by a shift in the forward
market in the opposite direction (Global Insight 2005), which again supports the finding
that ρ < 0.
4.3 Real-World Parameters and the Market Prices of Risk
Re-running the Kalman filter over the spot data provides far less certainty with respect to
the parameters, but we are able to obtain the parameter ranges shown in Table 2.
κ β µξ λξ
≈ 12 - 25 ≈(-15) - (-2) ≈ 0.265 - 0.275 ≈ 0.07 - 0.08
Table 2: Parameter ranges under the physical measure
The spot data was sufficient to discern that β is negative but not to determine its magni-
tude.5 Figure 4 shows the filter-predicted short-term market-price of risk, λχ with a range
5β was also found to be negative in an extension to Schwartz and Smith (2000) performed on crude oil
but there too the data wasn’t sufficient to estimate its size.
15
June 03 Dec 03 June 04 Dec 04 June 05 Dec 05
−800
−600
−400
−200
0
200
400
600
800
MP
R
β = 3
β = 6
β = 9
Figure 4: Predicted λχ with varying β
of possible βs. We can see the short-term price of risk is very high during the uncommonly
mild weather that occurred from October to late-February during the winter of 2004/2005.
At that time traders were reported to have believed that supplies in store were more than
enough to comfortably withstand the rest of the winter (Heren 2001-2006). This supports
our claim that the market demands a higher risk-premium when inventory levels are higher
than seasonal storage plans would have predicted, owners of storage being aware that any
further gas placed into storage might not actually be used. We remark that this is a similar
finding to Brennan (1958) except that we have explained that risk-price adjustment using
inventory levels relative to seasonal expectations, as opposed to absolute inventory levels.
This belief, that winter was essentially over,6 meant that when the prolonged Febru-
ary/March 2005 cold-spell actually came (occurring at the same time as supply problems
in the North Sea) prices reacted violently and the expected ability of storage to cope with
demand was completely reversed. The British cold weather was mirrored in Europe, creat-
ing high continental demand and causing Interconnector imports to fall to almost nothing.
This meant that “No longer able to depend on continental gas for swing volumes, the issue
of how much is left in UK storage also became critical.”7 As we can see in Figure 4 the
6In early February some market commentators were actually mooting starting putting gas back into stor-
age for the next winter.
7Heren Report, March 4th 2005.
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sudden, desperate need for storage supplies meant that the market price of risk fell dramati-
cally, actually becoming negative at the height of the spike. This demonstrates the flip-side
of our finding: that the market asks for a far lower (or even negative) price on risk during
periods when inventory levels are below what seasonal market needs would require them
to be. Moreover, Figure 5 shows short-term market price of risk for β = 3 with spot and
M+1 forward prices. Note that during periods of positive short-term shocks like in March
and Nov 2005, a large (in magnitude) negative short-term market price of risk (ie λχ < 0)
induces a relatively large positive drift in futures prices, see equation (10), which seems to
be corroborated by an increase in the M+1 forward during those periods.
The LT forward risk premium λξ, indicated a state of normal backwardation for UK gas
forwards with µ∗ being less than µ. It was, as postulated, a lot smaller in magnitude than
λχ being only about 7%.
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5 Model Application: Interruptible supply contracts
Now that the spot model has been posed and calibrated we are ready to price interruptible
contracts and other contingent claims based on the spot price of gas8. Interruptible con-
tracts9 give the supplier a set number of rights, typically 45, to temporarily cease supplying
gas to their customer for periods of a day at a time. The supplier can exercise these rights
at their discretion, with exercise giving the potential payoff of
Zt = max{St −Kt , 0},
where Kt is the contract price for the t th day.
An interruptible contract with one interruption can therefore be viewed as an Amer-
ican or Bermudan call option on the gas spot price, whilst an interruptible contract with
many exercises becomes a multi-exercise Bermudan option. However, because of the im-
possibility of simultaneous exercise, only one exercise is ever active at once. Previously,
attempts to value similar structures in energy markets, such as swing contracts, have fo-
cused on using methods such as trinomial trees (Jaillet, Ronn, and Tompaidis 2004), but
with higher dimensional problems, such as our LT/ST model, make these methods very
time-consuming, especially for derivatives with large numbers of exercises. More recently
Monte Carlo methods have been applied to early-exercise problems, first by Longstaff and
Schwartz (2001) for single-exercise problems, and then for the multi-exercise case, Mein-
shausen and Hambly (2004), Thanawalla (2005), Iba´n˜ez (2004) and Iba´n˜ez and Zapatero
(2004). In this section we will discuss these methods and then apply them to the pricing of
interruptible contracts.
5.1 Extended Least-Squares Monte Carlo Method
When deciding whether to exercise an American-style option before it’s maturity date the
option holder has to determine whether the current exercise value, Zt , of the option is higher
8At the time of writing we are aware of no other studies into the pricing of gas interruptible contracts.
9All terms and conditions are taking from EON Energy’s standard contract (E.ON Energy 2005)
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than the continuation value, Qt , of instead holding onto the option, where Qt is the expected
value of the option in the next period:
Qt(x) =

 E
[
Vt+1
∣∣∣Xt = x] t <T
0 t = T
,
where T is the maturity-date of the option.
Knowing the continuation value of the option yields the value function of the option:
Vt(x) = max
{
Zt(x) , Qt(x)
}
, (12)
and a natural optimal stopping-time for the option, τ:
τ = min
{
t : Zt >Qt
}
.
The central idea of the Least-Squares Monte Carlo (LSM) method of Longstaff and Schwartz
is to approximate this continuation value function for an American option (and by proxy
the value function and optimal-stopping rule of the option) using least-squares regression.
The LSM algorithm has proved robust and successful at pricing options, Moreno and
Navas (2003). One important place it falls down though is that as it is driven by an ap-
proximation to the optimal stopping rule it can only provide a lower bound to the true
value. However, for the LSM to be useful to price interruptible contracts it must be ex-
tended from the single-exercise case to the multi-exercise case. This extension has been
proposed and implemented by a number of authors: Do¨rr (2003), Meinshausen and Ham-
bly (2004), Thanawalla (2005) and we will refer to it as Extended Least-Squared Monte
Carlo, (XLSM).10 The XLSM algorithm differs from the LSM algorithm because instead
of approximating the optimal stopping-time τ for one exercise we must approximate the
optimal stopping-policy pi = {τn, . . . ,τ1} for n separate exercises.
5.2 Approximating the Continuation Values
For the XLSM we approximate the optimal stopping rule by calculating not just one contin-
uation value function at every time-point but n continuation value functions, Qnt (x) , . . . , Q1t (x),
10We will use the notation and algorithms of Meinshausen and Hambly (2004).
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one for every possible remaining exercise amount. The decision rule for the multi-exercise
case becomes “exercise the mth exercise if the marginal continuation value of the mth exer-
cise, ∆Qmt (x), is less than the exercise-payoff, Zt”, ie:
Zt(x) > ∆Qmt (x),
= Qmt (x)−Qm−1t (x).
By once again simulating a large number of sample paths we are ready to price options.
Now the XLSM algorithm works very similarly to the LSM algorithm, starting at maturity,
T , and iterating backwards. At time t we have continuation value functions for m = 1, . . . ,n
exercises for every time-point larger than t. With these we can calculate the optimal future
cash-flows for each path, given each of the possible amounts of exercises m = 1, . . . ,n that
one could have at that time. We then use these to perform the least-squares regression, as
in the LSM algorithm, to calculate Qnt (x) , . . . , Q1t (x) respectively. Once we have iterated
back to t = 0 we have an approximation to the marginal continuation value of each exercise
and therefore we have an approximation to the optimal stopping policy. With these we are
able to value multi-exercise claims.
5.3 XLSM Lower and Upper Bounds
Because of the numerical approximation error in the LSM and XLSM algorithms it desir-
able to construct both an upper and lower bound for the option value. With the approxi-
mated optimal stopping policy calculated in section 5.1 we can receive a lower bound for
the option by simulating a number of price-paths and determining what their average payoff
would have been under our sub-optimal, approximated stopping policy.
Calculating upper bounds in LSM, Rogers (2002), and XLSM, Meinshausen and Ham-
bly (2004), is based around the idea that the value of American-style options can be ex-
pressed as the infimum over a family of expectations. For completeness we will reproduce
the main theorem presented in Rogers (2002) for the case of one-exercise options. This
provides the intuition behind the upper bound and we will then state the theory in the case
of the multi-exercise problem as presented in (Meinshausen and Hambly 2004) and explore
its practical implementation.
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Theorem 1 Consider the amount paid to the holder of an American option at exercise
as an adapted process, (Zt)0≤t≤T , with a finite time horizon, T >0, defined on a filtered
probability space, (Ω,ℑ,(ℑ)0≤t≤T ,Q). Then the time-0 value, Y ∗0 of the American option
is given by:
Y ∗0 = inf
M∈H10
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
(Zt −Mt)
]
, (13)
where H10 is the space of martingales, M, such that sup0≤t≤T |Mt | ∈ L1 and M0 = 0.
This theorem provides a natural method for calculating the upper bound. First, choose
and construct a martingale, M ∈ H10 . And second, evaluate E
[
sup0≤t≤T (Zt −Mt)
]
using
numerical simulation techniques.
The multi-exercise upper bound is generated in a similar way through calculating the
upper bounds of the marginal values of each individual exercise, ∆V ↑,n0 , . . . ,∆V ↑,1. The
theory was introduced by Meinshausen and Hambly (2004), whose major result is as fol-
lows.
Theorem 2 The marginal value ∆V ∗,n0 is equal to:
∆V ∗,n0 = infpi infM∈H10
E
[
max
u∈(k\{τn−1,...,τ1})
(Zu−Mu)
]
, (14)
where k = {0, . . . ,T} is the set of possible exercise dates and 0 ≤ τn−1<.. .<τ1 are stop-
ping times and Mt ∈ H10 . Furthermore, the infimum is attained by the optimal policy of
stopping times, pi∗, and the optimal martingale M∗ with M∗0 = 0, whose increment at time t
is given by:
M∗t − M
∗
t−1 = ∆V
∗,m
t −Et−1
[
∆V ∗,mt
]
, (15)
where m is the smallest natural such that t >τm.11
This theorem has the advantage of identifying the optimal martingale. Given our ap-
proximated optimal stopping policy we generate an approximation of the martingale used
to value the upper bound of the marginal value of the nth exercise, ∆V ↑,n0 , along a certain
path by means of the following algorithm:
11There is a typo here in the original paper corrected here after correspondence with the author.
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1. First we must calculate the stopping-times, {τn−1, . . . ,τ1}, along the path, {Xt}t=1,...,T ,
that would have occurred under our approximated stopping policy if we started with
n−1 exercises.
2. Next we have to approximate the martingale increments in (15) along our path. We
use the stopping-times generated, as well as defining τn = 0, to choose the appropriate
continuation value function to use to calculate ∆V mt (Xt):
Time Continuation Value Function
0 < t ≤ τn−1 Qnt (x)
τn−1 < t ≤ τn−2 Qn−1t (x)
.
.
.
.
.
.
τm < t ≤ τm−1 Qmt (x)
Table 3: Appropriate Continuation Functions Used For Upper Bounds
3. To generate the martingale increment Mt −Mt−1 equation (15) requires us to approx-
imate two values: ∆V mt and Et−1[∆V mt ]. The first of these is given by
∆V mt (Xt) = V mt (Xt)−V m−1t (Xt),
where V mt (x) = max
{
Zt(x)+Qm−1t (x), Qmt (x)
}
,
and the second is approximated by Monte Carlo simulation:
Et−1[∆V mt ]≈
1
k
k
∑
i=1
∆V mt (X it ), (16)
where X it , i = 1, . . . ,k are independent one time-step evolutions of the path condi-
tional from Xt−1.
4. Once the martingale is generated a sample of the upper bound for the nth exercise is
evaluated by taking
∆V ↑,n0 = max
u∈(k\{τn−1,...,τ1})
(Zu−Mu) ,
The upper bound of the exercise value is the sample mean of a number of such samples,
each requiring its own martingale. Clearly this can become very computationally expense
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for an option with a large number of exercises. Once ∆↑,m0 is calculated ∀m = 1, . . . , n, then
the overall upper bound is given by,
V ↑,n0 =
n
∑
m=1
∆V ↑,m0 . (17)
5.4 Implementation and Benchmarking
We implemented the XLSM algorithm in MATLAB. The implementation was designed to
be reusable for different driving processes. This allowed the actual XLSM algorithm to
be tested against the results presented in Meinshausen and Hambly (2004) for an AR(1)
process with 1000 time-steps and a number of exercise amounts ranging from 1 to 100. The
results for the lower bound of our implementation and the results presented in Meinshausen
and Hambly (2004) were within 0.5% of one another whilst the upper bound estimates were
within 1− 2% of each other, though our implementation reported a higher standard error
for the upper bound. The lower bound was also tested, using GBM as the driving process,
against American put option prices reporting prices within 0.5% of those calculated by
finite-difference methods.
5.5 Contract Value and Interruptible Discount
The value of an interruptible contract can be expressed in one of two ways: either as a
straight monetary value (per therm of gas) or as a gas price discounted relative to the cost
of a firm supply of gas. Clearly these two values have a simple relationship: a one-pence
per therm discount on a year-long gas contract is worth the present value of a cash-flow
of 1p for every day of that year. Taking the annual interest rate as r = 4.5% this means
that a penny discount is worth ∑365t=1 e−rt/365 ≈ 357p at the start of the contract.12 Given
12This is only a rough approximation and does not take into account the fact that no payments are made on
an interruption day.
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Figure 6: 99% Confidence interval for the price of a 45 interruption winter start contract.
a gas price for firm supply, KF , and a set number of interruptions, n, we can calculate the
corresponding price for interruptible gas, KI , by finding the point where:
V n(KI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
InterruptionValue
= 357× (KF −KI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
DiscountValue
.
5.5.1 Strike Price
The first contract variable we will alter is the contract strike price, KI. Figure 6 shows a 99%
confidence interval for the value of an interruptible contract with 45 exercises spanning
from October 1st 2005 to September 30th 2006. The slope of the lower bound curve,
whilst seemingly linear, is not as steep as might be expected. This is because during the
typical life of a contract not every exercise available will actually be used.
Using these results we can see what discount we would offer the firm on the price of
gas. On October 1st, 2005 the Gas-Year Ahead 05/06 contract was trading at 66.75p/per
therm. Using the results in Figure 6 we can create a confidence interval for the appro-
priate interruptible gas price. As we can see in Table 4 the lower bound contract prices
suggest setting KI = 60.75p/therm, a 5.9625p discount. The upper bound prices suggest
setting KI = 60.25p/therm, a 6.4625p discount. Moreover, in the example shown here, for
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Strike KI 60 60.25 60.5 60.75
Contract CI [2164.35, 2298.45] [2162.2, 2286.45] [2160.8, 2287.8] [2149.25, 2286.75]
Discount CI [6.067, 6.443] [6.061, 6.410] [6.057, 6.413] [6.025, 6.410]
Discount 6.7125 6.4625 6.2125 5.9625
Table 4: Appropriate discount against firm price of 66.75 p/therm. All figures are in pence.
strike prices between 60.25 and 60.75 around 42.5 interruptions are used. As expected,
the inclusion of further interruptions increases the price of the interruptible contract but
the marginal increase in the contract value is decreasing in a linear fashion with respect to
strike for ranges KI ∈ [40,100].
6 Conclusions and Further Work
In this article we make two main contributions. Firstly, we explored the short-term market
price of risk in the gas market. In our analysis we explain changes in the risk-price, pre-
viously related to the absolute level of inventory in the literature Brennan (1958), in terms
of the inventory level relative to the expected seasonal storage patterns. Motivating this,
is the intuition that in the UK gas industry supplies are put into storage over the summer
and withdrawn over the winter in a pre-planned yearly cycle designed to help the market
cope with the tight winter supply/demand situation. What matters therefore is not whether
supplies are being put into or taken out of storage but how these injections and withdrawals
compare with what the market expectes them to be. In our work we tie these unexpected
deviations, modelled by χt , to the short-term market price of risk, λχ = α+βχt .
Running a Kalman filter over a data set of UK forward and spot gas prices we find β
to be negative. This implies that in the UK natural gas market, the short-term market price
of risk is higher when storage inventories are being depleted more slowly than the seasonal
storage plans suggest they should be. Essentially, if there is more gas in storage than the
market expects it will require a higher risk premium to be paid, for the duration of a period
of tight supply, in order to convince a market participant to put further gas into storage than
would have been demanded if there was a shortage in inventories relative to seasonal need.
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The second contribution comes through the use of the multi-exercise Extended Least
Squares Monte Carlo algorithm to value interruptible gas contracts. Given a price per therm
for the firm supply of gas we are able to give upper and lower bounds for the appropriate
per therm discount that a consumer should demand as compensation for entering into a
standard interruptible contract. The upper and lower bounds are found to be within 0.6p
of one another, a difference of less than 1% relative to our suggested price for interruptible
gas.
Both of these contributions open opportunities for further work. A larger time series
of forward data and a calibration method that accounted for the continuous delivery of gas
forwards, such as a particle filter, would allow a better calibration of the LT/ST model
to market data. Moreover, it is straightforward to see that a more realistic model should
include jumps in the short-term deviations process that will in turn affect the price of in-
terruptible contracts. Although the incorporation of jumps seems a natural way to model
gas price dynamics, the application of the standard Kalman filter would not be possible.
Hence, the richness of the insights provided by the understanding of the short-term market
price of risk would have been more difficult to obtain if a non-Gaussian model had been
chosen.
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